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A Decision of the EU Heads of State or Government, adopted as an annex to the 15 December 2016 European
Council conclusions, should allow to proceed with the ratiﬁcation process of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement. This process had been stalled following the Dutch referendum of 6 April 2016 when over 61 % of the
voters rejected the approval of the agreement in the Netherlands. Immediately after the referendum, Dutch Prime
Minister Rutte announced a reﬂection period to study the diﬀerent options to address the main concerns of the
Dutch electorate while still enabling the Netherlands to ratify the agreement. The Brexit referendum delayed this
exercise, and a ﬁrst attempt to adopt a ‘legally binding declaration’ by 1 November 2016 failed. In the following
weeks, Prime Minister Rutte threatened to terminate the ratiﬁcation procedure if no acceptable solution would be
found at the 15 December 2016 meeting of the European Council. After long and diﬃcult discussions, the 28
Heads of State or Government adopted a decision addressing the Dutch concerns.
Legal Nature of the Decision
The formula of a ‘Decision of the EU Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council’ is not
new in the EU’s legal practice. It has been used in the past in order to agree on certain guarantees for Denmark
and Ireland in the wake of the negative referenda on the Treaty of Maastricht (December 1992) and the Treaty of
Nice (June 2009) respectively and to decide on the location of the seats of a number of EU institutions and
bodies. More recently, the “new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union”, adopted before
the Brexit referendum in response to David Cameron’s request for a binding and irreversible new deal, also
followed the same logic. In that context, an opinion of the Council’s legal service already observed that this is “a
Decision of the Member States of the European Union, of an intergovernmental nature, not a Decision of the
European Council as an institution of the European Union”.
In other words, the Decision is an instrument of international law by which the Member States agree on how they
understand the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The European Council conclusions and an opinion of the
European Council’s legal counsel explicitly note that the Decision is legally binding on the 28 Member States and
can only be amended or repealed by common accord of their Heads of State or Government. Both the title and
the content of the instrument point in that direction. Yet, the legal implications are limited to the EU Member
States alone: its provisions cannot create any legal obligations for Ukraine (unless Ukraine would formally
declare its acceptance of the Decision). In that sense, it diﬀers from the Joint Interpretative Instrument on the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU and its Member States.
The latter is a binding source of interpretation in the sense of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The Decision on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, on the other hand, is a unilateral
interpretation which can only be used to assess the intentions of the EU Member States when becoming parties
to the agreement. It does not prejudice the interpretative position of Ukraine and cannot aﬀect the content of the
rights and obligations contained in the agreement itself. The Decision also does not entail a formal reservation or
opt-out from speciﬁc provisions of the agreement. Hence, upon ﬁnalisation of the ﬁnal ratiﬁcation requirements,
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement will fully enter into force as a mixed agreement binding upon the EU and
all its Member States. As such, its legal status will not be diﬀerent from that of the largely comparable
Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia, which were not subject to a popular referendum and already
entered into force without major discussions.
Substance of the Decision
The Decision identiﬁes six issues representing the main concerns that were raised during the referendum, i.e.
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the link between the agreement and Ukraine’s membership perspectives, the consequences of cooperation in
the ﬁeld of security, access to the national labour market, the ﬁnancial implications of the agreement and, ﬁnally,
problems of corruption and the state of the rule of law and democracy in Ukraine. Hence, the Decision must be
regarded as an answer to the often false information that was spread during the referendum campaign. For
instance, the ‘no-camp’ proclaimed that the Association Agreement is an entry ticket towards Ukraine’s future EU
membership, potentially leading to the involvement of Dutch soldiers in the Donbas region and a signiﬁcant
increase of ﬁnancial support to a largely corrupt political system. 
In essence, the Decision only conﬁrms the text of the Association Agreement. This is particularly clear with
respect to the importance of the ﬁght against corruption and respect for democratic principles, human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of the association and the possibility to adopt
appropriate measures in case of non-fulﬁlment of obligations. This can with so many words be derived from
Articles 2, 3, 14, 22, 459 and 478 of the Association Agreement. Also with respect to the other issues, the
Decision merely states the obvious. The Association Agreement does not provide for free movement of persons
and only includes a modest section on mobility of workers (Article 18), which is nothing more than a stand-still
provision. In the ﬁeld of security cooperation, Articles 7 and 10 of the Agreement refer to the aim of gradual
convergence in the area of foreign and security policy but this clearly falls short of providing for collective
security guarantees. Finally, also with respect to the membership issue it is plainly evident that nothing in the
Association Agreement leads to the conclusion that Ukraine is granted the status of a candidate country. This
being said, the agreement does not exclude Ukraine’s right to apply for membership under Article 49 TEU nor
does it predetermine the EU’s position if such a hypothetical scenario would materialise. The Decision does not
and cannot aﬀect this reality; it simply observes that there is no direct or automatic connection between the
Association Agreement and Ukraine’s membership perspectives.
Next steps
The Decision will take eﬀect upon the ﬁnalisation of all remaining ratiﬁcation procedures. In practice, this
requires the approval of the Dutch parliament (in two chambers) and the adoption of a unanimous Council
Decision concluding the agreement. The domestic approval in the Netherlands is not to be taken for granted at
this point since the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Rutte has no majority in the Dutch Senate. With upcoming
elections in March 2017, the political context is rather diﬃcult. If no parliamentary majority can be found for the
continuation of the ratiﬁcation procedure in the Netherlands, the EU arrives in legally uncharted waters. The
option which is currently on the table is by far the easiest to solve the ratiﬁcation conundrum while responding to
the arguments of the ‘no-camp’ in the referendum campaign. Any alternatives, such as the inclusion of formal
reservations or a procedure leading to a Dutch withdrawal from the agreement, entail the risk of long-term legal
uncertainty which would only be detrimental for the EU, the Netherlands and Ukraine.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  van Elsuwege, Peter: Towards a Solution for the Ratiﬁcation Conundrum of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement?, VerfBlog, 2016/12/16, http://verfassungsblog.de/towards-a-solution-for-the-
ratiﬁcation-conundrum-of-the-eu-ukraine-association-agreement/.
2/2
